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Because questions about relationships between ideas
and interests are absolutely fundamental in social
analysis they are so necessarily difficult to answer that
a solution is only marginally less suspect than the
solution. Yet, since Plato at least, it is from specula-
tions and discussions about how the human condition
can be improved, je from applied studies, that the
most important insights into humankind's under-
standing of humankind have come. Thus far, general
(rather than pure and unapplied) development
studies have yielded few such new understandings.
Why? What are the practical prospects of actually
achieving a new, that is renewed, generalism in public
policy studies?
The area of inquiry to be explored in this article is
some aspects of the intellectual scope and nature of
development studies since the end of World War H. It
may prove difficult to separate this area sharply and
completely from others, such as the morals and poli-
tics of our subject and the principal techniques of
analysis on which it relies, but at any rate perhaps a
difference in degree or emphasis can be maintained.
Development studies haveagain with excep-
tionspersisted over at least the last quarter of a
century in being primarily third parties' doctrinal,
visionary, distant encounters with what they construe
as a world of a different, yes a third, kind. Interlarded
though these may be with travel and adventure in
distant lands they are, even so, seldom assis-
tedeven technicallyby those with historical
insight and similar suitable preparation in the country
or region concerned. This is very paradoxical, above
all for studies which, precisely because they have
been deemed to be about something 'other', surely
require such insight in special measure.
So, what has happened? Much literature in develop-
ment studies seeks just for 'models' to be learned and
then replicated or transferred elsewhere. If there is
anything at all to learn from this 'learn from models'
literature, it is that 'the models' have come to take the
place of what they were originally supposed only to
represent. Such models are said merely to need
replicating elsewhere; the literature is usually either
silent altogetheror else extremely selectiveabout
the political, historical, financial and other contexts
in which the experience to be emulated occurred in
the first place. Worse, as a rule, it does not consider
the actual or potential options, or the costs of either.
Seldom is the slightest inkling given of the setbacks
that even success stories have probably faced at some
stage. Image becomes mirage. The model is pre-
sented as if it were sufficiently descriptive as well as
suitably prescriptive. Thus does one purpose or vari-
ety of development studies come to be confused with
another, and as a result neither is well served.
Interdisciplinarities
At a conference once, a participant described herself
as a 'specialist in general matters'. Is such a position
tenable, and if so what does it amount to?
One of the main concerns in the learning and teach-
ing of development studies is, by whatever methods,
the assembling and interpreting of ideas and informa-
tion for a policy-oriented study of action rather than a
philosophy-oriented study of knowledge [Sinaceur
1977:571-9, Gusdorf 1977:580-600]. When this
kind of intelligence work gets transferred from, as it
were, the operations room to the universities, it may
indeed be apt 'to get lost in discussions about the
relations between disciplines, between the specialisa-
tions, and the temptations to discern the premises of a
new synthesising, coordinating, unifying philisophy'
[Sinaceur 19711. The cosmology of educational
institutions being dominantly discipline-structured, it
is only to be expected that any attempt to transcend
disciplines in them is likely to fall into the trap of
trying to come up with a supra-discipline.
It is the idea that a specialist interdisciplinarity must
be realised in an orthodox single disciplinary form
that has helped lead to the institutionalisation in uni-
versities and institutes of, for example, 'development
economics'. This relates to an idea that the discipli-
nary rigour and techniques in economics, which, for
the most part have been developed outside growth
studies, should be applied to development problems,
and oriented towards economic policy and planning.
The reasons why development economics has grown
so strong, in outward results as well as in self-identity,
could provide the basis for a separate discussion. It
has in part been fostered as one way of making inter-
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disciplinarity practical and a single discipline less
impracticable. The same could have been true in
principle at least for 'development sociology' and
'development anthropology' if these too had proved
to be growth industries in academia. They are not
partly because even 'development economics' has
come to stand as a warning.
At the onset of the 1970s, much effort in sociology
and social anthropology went into the production of
something described as 'beyond the sociology of
development'. This would present rather different
issues for discussion if something substantial of the
kind could really be brought forward for scrutiny,
rather than it having remained, for the best reasons,
more a sentiment unfilled than an achievement.
How, in practice, have interdisciplinary approaches
actually been used? First, in most technocratic (and
some reformist) policy circles, they seem to be com-
monly applied, in theory and in practice, to 'other'
and not 'our own' (or even to 'other' in relation to
'our own') cultures, economies, societies. Only sec-
ondarily could they be said to have been applied to
(say) the study of a particular topic, namely economic
growth, since even the status quo in 'other cultures' is
said not to be understandable ('to us') except in
interdisciplinary terms. Certainly, many economic
modernisation studies, and many in the dependency
mode too, are about a perceived world which they
suppose to be culturally completely, totally, other.
Disciplinaristic considerations about inderdiscipli-
narity prove to be secondary tooin studies abroad,
at home, and in between. To take economics by way
of example again, whilst for some of its practitioners
[cg Thirlwall 1974] growth is properly a subject for
study 'unadulterated' by the intrusions of other disci-
plines, for others [Loewe 1965:284] already some
years ago it seemed as if 'the study of economic
growth were to become the centre of a new
Methodenstreit in which model-constructing theorists
would vie with historically and sociologically minded
empiricists'.
Everything has precedents. There is enlightenment
and an Enlightenment. Advocacy of an 'enlightened
interdisciplinary approach', as something other than
simply 'multidisciplinarity by juxtaposition and
accumulation on the heap of stones principle . . . a
monstrous epistemological Tower of Babel' [Gusdorf
1977], has been associated recentlyprecisely as it
I am grateful here to James Gould before the conference for
reference to K. Simeonova, 1973, 'The interdisciplinary move-
ment and the organisation of scientific research', Zagadnienia
Naukoznawstwa (special issue on 'Problems of The Science of
Science').
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was in Europe in the eighteenth centurywith
Reason, Unity of Knowledge and yes Progress and
Development and Unified Science.' In this lies one,
perhaps the chief, means for making interdisciplinary
methods practical, namely the formalistic and
neopositivist 'systems theory' version of the
structural-functional vision in which all phenomena
are quantified, or at any rate quantifiable.
This unification perspective could be called the
academic method as in academic sociology, academic
economics and academic political science and so on.
There is a tendency perhaps for the view to prevail in
academic interdisciplinarity that 'to ascertain the
relative importance of economic and non-economic
satisfaction.. . is to ascertain the relative importance
of measurable and non-measurable ones' [Scitovsky
1976], but this did not deter the rise of quantitative
academic geography a decade or so ago, not to men-
tion kinship algebra in anthropology, physics in poli-
tics, and so on, long before that.
A second variety of interdisciplinarity could be
described less as unification than aspartnership, usu-
ally of the rider and horse variety with, as a rule,
economics in the saddle riding other-disciplines'
beasts. This form saw a particularly intensive
development in the early years of the Chicago journal
Economic Development and Cultural Change, the
most crucial characteristic of which, perhaps, is
expressed succinctly in the very title itself.
A third variety could as well be called critical or
radical. It would include the Marxist method which
was critical of
the bourgeois academic economist [and bourgeois
academic sociologists and political scientists etc]
who attempted to draw a sharp line between static
and dynamic analysis, hoping to transform the one
into the other by injecting some 'dynamising' ele-
ment into the static system. . . preferably expressible
in equations, and relegate all that does not fit into the
province of the sociologists. The academic sociolog-
ists make similar distinctions on a rather lower level
of scientific interest, the historians on an even hum-
bler one . . . this is not Marx's way. The social
relations ofproduction (ie the social organisation in
its broadest sense) and the material forces of pro-
duction, to whose level they correspond, cannot be
divorced . . . 'Economic development' cannot be
simplified down into 'economic growth'.
[Bottomore and Rubel 1978]
A fourth variety can be called dental. While in this
variety of interdisciplinarity the participation of
other disciplines may be needed (one could for exam-
pie think of anthropology as optometry, geography as
surgery, political science as ears, nose and throat
medicine, and so on), it is to economics that the teeth
in public policy are reserved. It differs from the
horse and rider variety in not regarding partnership
with other disciplines as absolutely essential but only
as desirable. A fifth is bad (although this variety has
no monopoly on badness). I am thinking here of
those interdisciplinary teams which have been criti-
cised or blamed, not for having no economist,
sociologist, or whatever in them but only bad
economists, sociologists, and so on, because their
good cousins were more expensive and in any case
preferred the more upright paths on which their pro-
fessional careers depended. A sixth variety is wrong
interdisciplinarity (which has no monopoly of
wrongness), when either the wrong disciplines have
been gathered for the task in hand or the right discip-
lines but the wrong specialisations inside them.
The fourth, fifth and sixth of these varieties resemble
assemblages of disciplines (multidisciplinarity) more
than new single disciplines of interdisciplinarity But
certainly these all contrast sharply with the single
disciplinary approach, as in, for example, the
orthodox opinion Loewe embraced in his earlier life
(and rejected later) that 'economic theory had to be a
self-contained body of generalisation, independent
of sociopolitical considerations and valid for all types
of economic systems' (Loewe 1965), or various cur-
rent textbook neo-classical positions and orientations
and/or monetarist economic policy positions.
Some years ago, a past President of the Royal
Econömic Society observed that the several con-
spicuous advances in economics pertinent to
development planning included'.., the refinement
of the logic of resource allocation and decision mak-
ing; the building of growth models; econometric
analyses of systems of economic forces'. But he went
on to say that, because the world's most pressing
problems include
fostering growth in poor countries and improving
the performance of the indu.strialised economies;
adjusting the balance of payments; checking cost
inflation while maintaining full employment; check-
ing the adverse effects on the environment and the
quality of life of industrialism; population growth
and urbanism, [it would have been better for]. . . the
traditional boundary between the subject matters of
economics and other social sciences [to be removed
and for economists' studies in public policy to bel
field-determined not discipline-determined.
[Phelps Brown, presidential address,
Royal Economic Society, 1971]
I cannot at the moment think of a past President of a
Royal Sociological or Social Anthropological Society
being so forthright and so forthcoming in support of
such a realistic, as well as generalist, position. This,
however, may be for very understandable historical
reasons: the somewhat separate professional
development of applied anthropology for example,
or post-independence developments in some African
universities and institutes which have put an-
thropology in the former metropolitan countries on
the defensive. But the story of sociology in the 'radi-
cal Africana' which emerged in the publishing world
from the end of the 1960s, is rather different. At
some risk of incestthe game that all family can
playthe concept of 'a theory of practice' that the
anthropologist Roger Bastide began to develop [B as-
tide 1973], and which potentially has a very wide
scope indeed as a social method of development
studies and development planning, could be turned
first of allbut not hereto this sociological history.
Interdisciplinary efforts in universities have diver-
sified into what in terms of their theoretical rationales
could be called 'aspectual' and 'synthetic'. Com-
monly central to the aspectual perspective is a notion
of rural (or other) development as something basi-
cally 'economic' but with 'social', 'cultural', 'physical'
and other 'aspects' also of importance. Occasionally,
development is conceived as being centrally some-
thing which is other than economic, merely having
economic aspects. It is of course this pattern of think-
ing about aspectual elements that is most notably
omnipresent in the 'modernisation' theme of the
'social obstacles to economic growth' literature.
Characteristic of the synthetic perspective is a view of
social studies as being not discipline- but problem-
focused. A primary postulate here is that problems in
'the real' world are very different from those in the
'academic'. If, with particular regard to rural
development in other countries, synthetic interdiscip-
linary approaches to rural studies are less developed
in agricultural colleges than elsewhere, this can be
explained: they are best kept at a safe distance.
Aspectual interdisciplinary approaches in develop-
ment studies founder principally in two ways. Either
the individual disciplines in the mix 'talk past', or else
'talk against' each other. Talking past tends to be the
trouble with alliances of say neo-classical economics
with positive (also called neo-classical) sociology,
where the economics brought to bear is a-social
economics, and the sociology 'a-economic' (and
a-political etc). Talking against each other, or simply
not communicating at all, may be what usually hap-
pens when, say, neo-classical economies and critical
sociology meet (or rather do not meet). The differ-
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ence is as much one of paradigms or conceptual
schemes as of disciplines. Within even 'the same'
discipline there are different schools of thought. The
frontiers of knowledge in development studies would
lie more at the limits of these than of the discipline
[Lall 1976]. The integrity of the discipline may be no
more than that of the school of thought. The world is,
after all, fact as well as fiction.
The problems most commonly encountered by
synthetic interdisciplinarity are the following. As
seen 'from within' and 'from below',society is not as
seamless as can appear 'from above'. This means that
'the' problem of, for example, 'poverty', is not singu-
lar but plural, a problem of poverties. Again, seen
'from below' and 'from within', problems tend often
to be attributed to forces which in their origins and
other ways are seen partly or even principally as
coming 'from above' and 'from without'. Evaluations
of policy and planning, where these are available at
all, tend to be exceptionally difficult to use compara-
tively.
The varieties of interdisciplinarities in the academy
have their parallels in the planning office. The physi-
cal planning which looks for physical solutions for
physical problems, the economic planning which
seeks economic solutions to problems seen as
economic problems, and so on, is 'facet' planning.
'Integrated' means some kind of mix of physical plus
economic plus other policy planning. Each instance
of facet planning has its own characteristics to an
extent. For example, physical planning tends, as a
rule, to be concerned with stocks rather than flows
because physical infrastructure is a stock of material
goods in particular locations, with longer rather than
shorter life spans. Economic planning tends to be
more concerned with flows than stocks and tends
often to be shorter term. Integrated planning means
not simply the multiplicity or coordination of facet
approaches but at least the simultaneous determina-
tion of the objectives, their trade-offs, and the joint
use of policy instruments in all facet plans involved.2
It is, therefore, just like interdisciplinarity, a very rare
phenomenon indeed in theory and in practice.
As with facet plans, so with single disciplines in
schools and institutes of development studies. Each,
to some extent, has its own character and delimited
subjects and fields. At the same time, as also with
facet plans, a number of concerns is common to them.
Within the social sciences, as within the arts and
humanities, any one 'subject' may intersect with any
This paragraph stems partly from discussions with Deryke Bel-
shaw on regional planning at the School of Development Studies,
University of East Anglia, some years ago.
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other and between faculties there are linkages as
well.
Personalism
Certainly many current attempts (my own included)
to teach generalism in development studies are eclec-
tic, opportunist. The choice of elements for a non-
disciplinary understanding of even interdisciplinarity
in development studies can be highly personal, given
the shortage of the institutional, indeed institutional-
ised, apparatus of textbooks, dictionaries, audio-
visuals and sets of past years' examination questions
and the like that form the conventional stock-in-trade
of all the more usual industries in academia. Why a
more broadly based generalism has not been
achievedeven in more or less specific regardsis
not difficult to imagine. Some examples can be briefly
introduced:
i) 'Rural folk'
First, and frequently most important of all, there is a
background notion which comes to the very forefront
of most interdisciplinary, and many disciplinary, con-
cernsnamely that of 'rural folk'. It is common prac-
tice in many countries and theoriesand not only
development studiesto think of 'rural' and 'urban'
as covering two 'different types of society, with each
having, as it were, its own political economy. This has
meant that the teaching of 'rural development' in
urban-situated and urban-staffed universities and
institutes tends first of all to be about what is held to
be a systematically other kind of society and culture
altogether, in which the academics and policy makers
themselves do not even move, let alone have their
being. It tends to be mainly about wildly alternative
strategies for growth and development to those which
these authors and policy makers (je we) could accept
and act upon for their (ie our) own styles and modes
of livelihood. Would 'we' for a moment contemplate
taking the medicine we would recommend for others,
even on those occasions when 'the ailment' is neither
'theirs' nor for that matter 'ours' but rather a com-
mon complaint and sometimes to some extent also of
common genesis?
In such a context of social distance what has hap-
pened? The teachingand the practiceof
development studies has tended to become ripe sim-
ply for projections of the teachers' or policy makers'
or administrators' own personal, professional, social
or cultural hopes, fears, fantasies, ideologies and
theories of value and what have you. Throughout
social science history this has been so. For example,
Marx on 'peasants', or on the 'Asian mode of produc-
tion', is different from Marx on the period and the
place which he had experienced and whose history he
knew, namely industrial Europe.3 And so on.
It is precisely in this context of social and cultural
distance and historical unreality that an interdiscipli-
nary approach to development studies is the main
aim tor some, and a toolish tad or tear for others. It is
more in certain kinds of rural studies that this
approach has been essayed to a characteristic degree.
Turned on one's own face, the searchlight of interdis-
ciplinary approaches is too uncomfortable because it
is too blinding; turned on the faces of others, you can
see them without, as it were, them seeing you. In
certain kinds of urban development study also, inter-
disciplinary approaches have characteristically been
applied to other cultural groups, such as 'urban po-
verty groups'. Indeed, it was for these that the phrase
'the culture of poverty' was originally coined.4
The more remote and distant an object, the less direct
knowledge one may have of it In the absence of other
information, one generalises. Where there are plants
and animals, there are, as every farmer knows, insects
too. So what are we to make of such accounts as those
which appeared about rural development in China
some years ago, in scientific as well as literary period-
¡cals, that 'there are no files in China',5 or of such tour
accounts as 'there are no slums, we didn't see any' or
'everyone looked well and healthy'.
It is of course about China that there are such reports.
Philias flower, and phobias rage, if not on the basis of
no knowledge at all, then of only very little. More,
and the illusion is lost. China is 'a gigantic Rorschach
card into which different people can project and find
solutions to their homegrown discontents' [Berger
1974]. When I was teaching at the School of
Development Studies at Norwich, both sinophilia
and sinophobia in Third World rural development
studies in Britain were as current as tanzaphilia and
tanzaphobia,6 for similar reasons. lt was believed,
hoped, that in China and Tanzania the poverty and
uncertàinty of rural livelihoods had been successfully
The same would be true of many of the (single disciplinary)
classics of, for example, sociology including those unrelated to
the kind of change and development studies to which this article
holds up a prism.
See the work of Lee Rainwater and others discussed and
developed in H. T. Gans, 1972, People and Plans: Essays on
Urban Questions and Solutions (especially chapter 11 'Culture
and class in the study of poverty: an approach to anti-poverty
research'). ¡ am grateful here (and elsewhere) to Henk van
Roosmalen for his simple prism for the complex (or is it the other
way round?).
At different times and of course from different perspectives 'no
flies' were reported for both Republics of China: cg, G. S. Gale,
1955, 'No flies in China', Encounter, 19, April, pp 20-3 ,and J.
M. Brewster 'Traditional social structures as barriers to change'
in C. Wharton (cd) 1969, SubsLsience Agriculture and Economic
Development.
transformed. At a safe distance, rural development in
these two countries was contrasted with that in
almost all the rest of the world. They were lessons in
alternative futures even for rich countries suffering
late monopoly capitalism. A remedy for ailments at
home was available, only it was far away.
One problem with this position was, and to some
extent still is, that because it was about something far
away, one was not in a position to know very much
about it except from a very limited range of sources,
which were at least as often self-serving as not.
Sinophilia and sinophobia supposed that what had
become of 'rural folk' in China was known and under-
stood sufficiently and was the way ahead to be
recommended, or otherwise, elsewhere. Tan-
zaphiliaand at least to some extent tanzaphobia-
supposed of 'rural folk' that what had been in Tan-
zania was self-evident and also pointed to the way
ahead. In the one case planistration or poliplanistra-
tion was believed to have transformed, and in the
other to have restored, rural society. Empirical and
evaluative case studies were, for the most part, not
available. Worse, they were not wanted.7
ii) 'Ethnic folk'
Other and similar forms of cultural idealism in public
policy rationalisation and evaluation relate to institu-
tionalism and ethnicism. Institutions seen as
attitudes, sentiments, habits, customs, values, ethics
and the like should be seen also as interests, politics,
power conflicts, competitions, and thus, among other
things, as matters of degree. And so they tended and
continue to be in institutional economics in the USA,
that isin the USA and on the USA at home. Abroad,
however, the institutional and other components of
other cultures are taken not only to be self-evidently
other, outlandish, but also not tobe matters of degree
and shadevarying from one situation and set of
circumstances to anothernor matters of interest,
power and influence. Also these components are
made to carry an extraordinarily large (and surely
non-economic) share of the burden of explanation, as
recourse to ordinary economic and other proofs has
been ruled out. However legitimate this may be in
certain circumstances, it is most certainly not an out-
come of any close encounter with what is intended to
be portrayed.
On tanzaphilia sec Colin Leys, 1 runsitto,,, 1965. Noie with reter-
ence to sinophilia/phohia debate, for example, such rcactions to
Simon Leys' work as Edward Friedman, 1978, 'Simon Leys
Hates China: America loves Simon Lcys', Bulletin of Co,,terned
Asian Scholars, vol lO no 3, pp 19-27. (Noie also that Colin Leys
and Simon Leys are different people.)
In lamenting the lack of precision that is the necessary price of
views from afar, it is true too of course thai perspective can he
gained only at a distance.
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It is by no means only academic economics that is to
blame. The actual practice of anthropology as a pro-
fessional academic discipline, and more publicly, has
gone hand in hand with the intellectual creation, at
least justification, ôf a Third World. Anthropological
and other endeavours to comprehend the diversity of -
humankind originally took to Africa and
Indiarather than finding therecertain social
notions such as 'tribe' and 'caste'. Neither is this a
one-way approach: 'European' challenges naturally
called forth 'African', 'Asian' and other responses.
Of the nature and scope of the mental export, as it
were of a Third World to a Third World, there is
much to be learned from a sharp criticism of some
recent approaches in international relations and
policies towards and in the 'Middle East' (West
Asia)':
The questions to be asked are not military or political
or tactical in the narrow sense. You must ask your
expert Arabists. . . to tell you why they misinformed
'ou about Arab traditions and 'the Arab mind',
why they preferred to prove an innate Arab hostility
and passivity by scandalous distortions of history all
the people feel and have felt when they are bullied,
why they are demoted to second class citizens on
their own land, where they are treated as bad
natives. [Said 1974]
A few years later, having observed that gross ignor-
ance persisted, as it will whenever fear of the differ-
ent gets translated into attempts at domination, the
same writer went on to explain:
Academic experts decreed that iii islam everything is
Islamic which amounted to the edifying notions that
there was such a thing as the 'Islamic mind', that lo
understand the politics ofAlgeria one had best con-
sult the Koran, that they (the Muslims) had no
understanding of democracy, only of repression
and mediaeval obscurantisms. Conversely it was
ageed that so long as repression was in the US
interest it was not Islamic but a form of modernisa-
tion. The worse misjudgements followed... Sud-
denly it appeared that Islam was back when Ayatol-
lah Khomeini, who derives from a long tradition of
opposition to outrageous monarchy, stood on his
national, religious and political legitimacy as an
Islamic righteous man. But in Iran and elsewhere,
islam had not simply 'returned': it has always been
there not as an abstraction or a worry hut as part of a
way people believe, give thanks, have courage, and
so on . .. Muslims live in history and in our com-
mon world, not simply in the Islamic context.
[Said 19791
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The Guardian newspaper in a leading article the
other day was speaking of 'the worst in the Iranian
character' and of 'Iranians [being] all of a piece'. This,
precisely as Fred Halliday said in a letter (10
November 1979) to that newspaper, is only
to resort to the kind of haughty racist generalisation
that has mercifully now been driven out of public
discourse when applied to such victims of oppres-
sion as Blacks, Jews and the Irish.... The irony is
that in positing an essentially 'extremist' Iranian
character against an implicitly reasonable
Guardian-reading westerner, you merely reverse the
simplistic outlook of the. . . pure islamic East and
[the] corrupt infidel West.
This kind of pattern and process of misunderstanding
has a number of predictable and easily distinguished
features. The habits of mind that in the West
distort our views of the East are often basically the
same as those which have warped our views of the
West as, for example, when one analyses by oppo-
sites, like good versus bad, spiritual versus material,
and so on. The terms in which the uniqÛeness of the
East is described originally referred to perceived con-
trasts in the West. It follows that such conceptions
and perceptions may tell us more about the West and
projections of its hopes and fears than about the East.
lt is only to be expected,therefore, that for example
'. . . the Eastern Despot is essentially a European
concept and [that] the story of its fortunes belongs
properly to the history of European thought rather
than to the history of Asia, [Steadman 1969].
When other cultures are seen also as other periods,
for example in a succession or sequence of stages of
historyany or each of which may at different times
be found in a different placenew realms of diffi-
culty for public policy analysis appear alongside the
old. Whenever concepts such as 'feudal', 'precapital-
ist' and indeed 'capitalist' which normally are used in
evolutionary and similar ways, are used outside
theories of evolution, for.evaluation, even the 'mode
of production' can hardly be domesticated into a
productive 'mode of thought'.
Stereotypically the-anthropologist is supposed to be a
romantic. Anthropology 'is based upon and prizes a
much more diffuse (less role segmented) involvement
in "field work" [than sociology]. . . both in the inten-
sity of involvement that it permits and in the diversity
of personal attributes that it requires' {Gouldner
1975]. It does not exactly fit this image if the an-
thropologist comes from the perils and pleasures of
the field with a message such as. well, you see, while
'certainly a European or American would be entit-
led to feel that the Islamic multitudes are underde-
veloped, yet . . . underdeveloped is a relative cul-
tural and economic Judgement and not mainly
'Islamic', in nature [Said 1979].
Non-cultural-idealist positions are precisely what an
anthropologist is conventionally expected to avoid
because in effect they act to devalue his or her travels
into distant and exotic lands. Encounters of a third
kind have, for anthropologists, understandably and
given the structure of the rest of academia, been
professionalised. Substantivism in social science has a
special association with, and value for eg some
schools of economic anthropology8 while for others
[Semenov 1975: 207-13] it 'misses the point'
altogether.
iii) 'Summit folk'
And now another perceived, and perceiving, species,
'summit folk'. Different fields of development
studies have their own forms of learned ignorance.
One of these, in population studies, surfaced in the
speech read by the President of the World Bank in
April 1977 in which high population growth was
explained only with reference to.....religious, social
and political reasons', whilst economic and ecological
reasons received no mention. This 'view from above'
can be regarded as a particular variety of summitry
(which is by no means confined just to population
studies). The effect of itif anymay well be actu-
ally to help create a pro-natalism, which is or
becomes religiously or socially inspired, where it did
not exist before (or to reinforce a pro-natalism which
did already exist). Politicians and, of course, Ihe rural
bulk of the population at largein poor countries at
any rateare perfectly well aware of economic
reasons9 why some farm families are planned to be
large. The McNamara statement, by dwelling on
'religion' and so on, has the probably unintended
effect of making the 'non-economic' appear as not
non-, but anti-, or dis-, economic.
In demogenics, as in other branches of our subject,
the researcher and teacher as well as the public
spokesman and policy maker are apt to lose touch
with economic, and ecological, realities. One way of
doing this follows from simply misinterpreting or
misrepresenting an economic factor by calling it a
social factor. Another follows from supposing that
See, for instance, M.Sahlins, 1974, Stone Age Economics. For an
introduction to a discussion 'The substantivist-formalist con-
troversy', see Anne Sharman-Bader, 1975, Department of
Sociology, University of East Anglia. mimen.
See Raymond Apthorpe, 1974, 'Population, public policy and
social development', Philippine Planning Journal VI, 1 October,
pp 1-12 as well as, of course, the more substantial research by
Mamdani, Ben White and others noticed by Mavin Harris, in
Cultural Materialism (1979).
substantively economic factors necessarily divide
into different orders of importance, corresponding
with what are seen as different types or orders of
society, or culture, from one's own, and then, conve-
niently, putting the economics of these other societies
right out of analytical court. A thirdespecially in
population studiesis simply to brand a whole com-
plex of issues as being of interest to 'Marxists' only.
With this confusing of certain kinds of 'economic'
with certain kinds of 'social', 'religious', 'political'
and other factors, it is only natural that other cultures
and societies should be found to be so categorically
different as to be inordinately difficult to analyse. So
labels are used insteadbad ones like 'superstition',
good ones like 'how interesting'. The standpoint of
generalism in development studies does not require
or imply that there are no differences at all between
one culture and society or another. That would be
culturally and socially, let alone intellectually,
absurd. It is rather that cultures and societies are not
normally, as it were, completely other, completely
different, as culturally idealist positions tend to sup-
pose. A norm, a sanction, a validation or a legitima-
tion, is not necessarily at the same time also a descrip-
tion or an evaluation of actual behaviour in any soci-
ety. If it were, there would probably have been no
need in social studies for a concept of norm, in the
first place.
The speech just mentioned suggested that the alloca-
tion of public services should be denied to parents
with more children than some specified norm. Even
to contemplate such a policy without taking into
account economic realities of both wants and needs
for more children in, for instance, certain kinds of
agricultural situation, is not simply to make a false
analysis: it is to make no analysis at all.
Of course 'social' and 'economic' can be construed,
either very differently or very similarly, in any
number of ways and certainly not only those just
touched on here. If 'the economic' can somehow be
included in 'the social', the opposite is also the case,
and one view of 'Marx's system' was that its
closed spiral linkage of events [was] due to the
absorption of the social into the economic process
[with I the reciprocal relations [being understood as]
much more comprehensive, [and with I the institu-
tional framework.. . no longer seen as a constant
but as subject to a predictable process of transforma-
tion. . . . Once capitalist evölution is set on its fateful
course nothing can remain invariant. In
methodological terms no independent variables are
left; a cyclodynamic fred back mechanism has swal-
lowed up the 'knowns' as well as the 'unknowns' of
the problem. [Hobsbawm 1964]
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Neglect, or encapsulation, of a variety of materialist
notions in a variety of ideationist ones is, seen 'from
below', often a general feature of views 'from above'.
Hierarchies may appear to be founded on different
principles and premises according to whether one is
taking a top downwards, or a bottom upwards, view
of, or in, them. Cultural idealism is very much associ-
ated with top downwards explanations and evalua-
tions. Role theory in social structural and other
analysis is but one example of this. It is interesting
historically that in Viifredo Pareto's system, 'role'
was primarily used in the sense of a professional role
such as that of a lawyer, namely, with reference to a
position 'at a certain altitude' in society [Pareto 1935:
chapter 12]. To use role theory as a means of concep-
tualising and understanding an entire society of roles
and positions and statuses and persons, but regard-
less of their different levels in society, could result in
simply denying existence to these levels. This would
be not flat earth but flat society theory.
We are all 'ethnic folk' in a way, all 'summit folk' at
some level. Some of us rural too. The purposes for
which cultural idealism is unsuitable are not the only
ones in development studies. Indeed, inspirational
endorsements and essentialist re-endorsements of
thought and action (as when a secretary might say he
'couldn't be accused of being lazy because he was a
Protestant', or a student that she 'occupied the
embassy in the name of Islam , not any particular
political party' have instrumental as well as other
value [Apthorpe and Gasper 1979].
Where Do We Go from Here?
Where do we go from here? If remedies lie in the
looking for them, as a student of S. F. Nadel's Social
Anthropology was brought up to say, then, where
should we look?
There is, I believe, something to learn especially for
the teaching of development studies, from the posi-
tion in literary criticism that to understand Ben Jon-
son and enjoy him 'does not so much require the
power of putting ourselves into seventeenth century
London as it requires the power of setting Jonson in
our London' [Eliot 1919, 1941]. The point is that to
do this, one will have, not least, to understand 'our
London' as well. Such less abstract approaches would
not only unpack or unload these categories and think,
say, of 'Whitehall' not 'Westminster' (just to keep
within summit London); of say 'neo-classical' rather
than 'western' economics or sociology; of at least say
'India' or 'China' rather than 'Asia'; 'Nigeria' or
'Uganda' rather than 'Africa', and so on. Such
approaches would identify the authorship of these
more limited accounts or impressions and then, again
like literary criticism, ask about the relationships and
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the interrelations between subject and author, author
and subject, and the meanings and purposes of these.
The teaching of development studies should also
always distinguish between such purposes and var-
ieties of our concerns as description, explanation,
prescription, prediction, diagnosis and evaluation
before going on to see whether any links can, or
cannot be made, between them.
The difficulties for an interdiscipline, or a new single
discipline, or a non-discipline, of development
studies, are indeed very similar to those confronting a
general theory of planning if
the kinds of problems that planners deal with-
societal pro bi emsare inherently diffrrent from the
problems that scientists and perhaps some classes of
engineers deal with. Planning problems are inher-
ently wicked.. . there is no definitive formulation of
a wicked problem . . . wicked problems have no
stopping rule. . . solutions to wicked problems are
not true or false but good or bad . . . there is no
immediate and no ultimate test of a solution to a
wicked problem . . . every solution to a wicked
problem is a one shot operation; because there is no
opportunity to learn by trial and error, every attempt
counts significantly . . . every wicked problem can
be considered to be a symptom ofanother problem.
[Rittell and Webber 1973: 155-69]'°
A common, a scope and nature, a principles or a
generalist course is one, but obviously only one, of
the elements that go to make up a development
studies curriculum. In the development studies cur-
ricula familiar in Western Europe, Africa or Asia,
both disciplinary and interdisciplinary approaches
appear to invest more in their 'specialist' rather than
'generalist' components. Their generalism may be
either disciplinary or interdisciplinary, or both, in its
effects and outcomes. But in their concerns with
public policy problems and the histories of thinking
and theorising about them, 'generalist' courses of
study have to transcend their particularist sources of
all kinds and thus become nondisciplinary in
intentuntil the generalist study of change and
development is itself seen as a new single (not supra),
discipline. Whereupon the whole process of estab-
lishing and clarifying generalism will need to start
again.
How different sorts of problems are defined will
depend in part, of course, on what sorts of solutions
O The debate that followed the publication of this essay in the same
journal, joined by J. F. Reynolds and Milton Mamey, and A. J.
Baum (eg see vol 6 no 1), while refuting some overstatement, is
itself overstated, as Desmond Gasper remarks (in litt).
to them could, and should, be sought." Problems for
policy studies are 'wicked' if the solutions envisaged
and sought for them are 'wicked' too. This may be not
for any scapegoating reason but, for example,
because of the theories of planning which imply that
the rules of the game should be subject to review and
change even while the game is being played. If the
problems for development studies are non-
disciplinary in the first (or last) place, then obviously
a specifically disciplinary or interdisciplinary search
for them gets off to a bad start. If, in addition, this
start is also historically and culturally 'external' it
stands to reason that the approach is at an even
greater disadvantage.
Development studies are, in short, doubly distanced.
First, there is the general character of the social sci-
ences which has itself been described as 'founded on
what Jacques Berque has termed the dialectic of the
Same and the Other, the alternating of cumulative
process of identification and "distancing". . .' [Sachs
1976: 75J12 Regardless of the parts of the globe and
the periods of time at issue, there is much reliance, in
(perhaps all) science, on other-ification (also known
as object-ification). Second, as the instances'3 'rural
folk', 'ethnic folk' and 'summit folk' in this articleS
have shown, development studies social science has
come to be almost exclusively about an objectively
and subjectively perceived entirely Other World.
The discovery of the Third World does indeed mark a
caesura in the history of our generation [Sachs 1976:
xi,fn 3]. But isn't it a matter more of invention than
discovery?
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